Critical Discussion: Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition: A Reply to Kelp and Greco
- Krist Vaesen
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Elsewhere, I have challenged virtue epistemology and argued that it doesn’t square with mundane cases of extended cognition. Kelp (forthcoming, this journal) and Greco (forthcoming) have responded to my charges, the former by questioning the force of my argument, the latter by developing a new virtue epistemology. Here I consider both responses. I show first that Kelp mischaracterizes my challenge. Subsequently, I identify two new problems for Greco’s new virtue epistemology.
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- Critical Discussion: Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition: A Reply to Kelp and Greco
Volume 78, Issue 4 , pp 963-970
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Krist Vaesen (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands