, Volume 78, Issue 4, pp 963–970

Critical Discussion: Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition: A Reply to Kelp and Greco

Critical Discussion

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-012-9397-0

Cite this article as:
Vaesen, K. Erkenn (2013) 78: 963. doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9397-0


Elsewhere, I have challenged virtue epistemology and argued that it doesn’t square with mundane cases of extended cognition. Kelp (forthcoming, this journal) and Greco (forthcoming) have responded to my charges, the former by questioning the force of my argument, the latter by developing a new virtue epistemology. Here I consider both responses. I show first that Kelp mischaracterizes my challenge. Subsequently, I identify two new problems for Greco’s new virtue epistemology.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy and EthicsEindhoven University of TechnologyEindhovenThe Netherlands