Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument
- Jussi Jylkkä
- … show all 1 hide
Purchase on Springer.com
$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.
The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers’ variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist has to provide some reasons independent of anti-materialism itself to favour that reading of a term that supports his or her argument. Given that there are no such independent reasons, I conclude that we should put more weight on empirical considerations than on a priori discussion in resolving the question concerning the identity between a phenomenal state and its neural realiser.
- Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see. Nature, 391, 756. CrossRef
- Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (1996). Philosophy of mind and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Brown, J. (1998). Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities. Mind, 107, 275–304. CrossRef
- Chalmers, D. J. (1996). Conscious mind. In Search of a fundamental theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. J. (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In S. Stich & F. Warfield (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Chalmers, D. J. (2004). The foundations of two-dimensional semantics. In M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia (Eds.), Two-dimensional semantics: Foundations and applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. J. (2009). The two-dimensional argument against materialism. In B. McLaughlin (Ed.), Oxford handbook of the philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davies, M. (2004). Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework. Philosophical Studies, 118, 83–731. CrossRef
- Husserl, E. (1913/1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Jylkkä, J. (2008). Theories of natural kind term reference and empirical psychology. Philosophical Studies, 139, 153–169.
- Kripke, S. (1972/1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Oxford University Press.
- Monti, M. M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Pickard, J. D., Tshibanda, L., et al. (2010). Willful modulation of brain activity in disorders of consciousness. The New England Journal of Medicine, 362, 579–589. CrossRef
- Russell, B. (1912/1998). The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument
Volume 78, Issue 3 , pp 647-663
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Jussi Jylkkä (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku, Assistentinkatu 7, 20014, Turku, Finland