Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion
- Charlie Pelling
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In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion.
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- Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion
Volume 78, Issue 5 , pp 977-978
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Charlie Pelling (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK