Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology
- Christoph Kelp
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Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
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Volume 78, Issue 2 , pp 245-252
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Christoph Kelp (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, Leuven, 3000, Belgium