Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument
- Neil Campbell
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Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains.
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- Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument
Volume 76, Issue 1 , pp 137-145
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- Neil Campbell (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Ave., West, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3C5, Canada