A Note in Defence of Ratificationism
- Johan E. Gustafsson
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Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theory gives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, The Psychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Egan argues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. This paper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations. Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decision theory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.
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- A Note in Defence of Ratificationism
Volume 75, Issue 1 , pp 147-150
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Author Affiliations
- 1. Division of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 78 B, 100 44, Stockholm, Sweden