Evidence and Knowledge
- Clayton Littlejohn
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According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn’t. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson’s critics who think we should break more radically from E = K.
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- Evidence and Knowledge
Volume 74, Issue 2 , pp 241-262
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- Springer Netherlands
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- 1. University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA