There’s No Future in No-Futurism Authors
First Online: 14 September 2010 Received: 22 August 2008 Accepted: 19 August 2010 DOI:
Cite this article as: Tallant, J. Erkenn (2011) 74: 37. doi:10.1007/s10670-010-9245-z
In two recent papers Button (Analysis 66:130–135,
, Analysis 67:325–332, 2006 ) has developed a particular view of time that he calls no-futurism. He defends his no-futurism against a sceptical problem that has been raised (by e.g. Bourne in Aust J Phil 80:359–371, 2007 ) for a similar “growing block” view—that of Tooley (Time, tense, and causation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002 ). If Button is right, then we have an important third option available to us: a half-way house between presentism and eternalism. If, on the other hand, the criticism of Tooley-style “Growing-Block” views holds, then we are left with just presentism and eternalism. In this paper I show that Button’s defence fails. 1997 References
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