There’s No Future in No-Futurism
- Jonathan Tallant
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In two recent papers Button (Analysis 66:130–135, 2006, Analysis 67:325–332, 2007) has developed a particular view of time that he calls no-futurism. He defends his no-futurism against a sceptical problem that has been raised (by e.g. Bourne in Aust J Phil 80:359–371, 2002) for a similar “growing block” view—that of Tooley (Time, tense, and causation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997). If Button is right, then we have an important third option available to us: a half-way house between presentism and eternalism. If, on the other hand, the criticism of Tooley-style “Growing-Block” views holds, then we are left with just presentism and eternalism. In this paper I show that Button’s defence fails.
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- There’s No Future in No-Futurism
Volume 74, Issue 1 , pp 37-52
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Jonathan Tallant (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK