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Inclusionism and the Problem of Unmarried Husbands

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Abstract

I discuss a modification of Lewisian modal realism called ‘inclusionism’. Inclusionism is the thesis that some worlds contain other worlds as proper parts. Inclusionism has some attractive consequences for theories of modality. Josh Parsons, however, has raised a problem for inclusionism: the problem of unmarried husbands. In this paper I reply to this problem. My strategy is twofold: first I claim, pace Parsons, that it is not clear why the inclusionist cannot avail herself of an obvious solution to the problem; and second, I argue that even if there is no available solution, the same problem also afflicts Lewis’ original theory. Therefore, even if the problem remains unsolved, we have not been given any reason to think that an inclusionist version of Lewisian realism is worse than the original.

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Notes

  1. I use ‘world’ and ‘possible world’ interchangeably.

  2. See Bricker (2001), Parsons (2007a, p. 166), Sider (2003), Sect. 3.8.

  3. See Parsons (2007a, pp. 166–168); for discussion of one such antirealism, see Divers (2004); for another see Rosen (1990).

  4. See Yablo (1999).

  5. This formulation comes from Yablo (1999, p. 483).

  6. See Bricker (2001) for instance.

  7. There is a complication due to Lewis’ appeal to ‘analogous spatiotemporal relations’. See Lewis (1986, pp. 74–76). I ignore this complication here.

  8. And not all of them are vulnerable to the problem discussed below—the ‘upwards inclusionism’ of Bricker (2001) is not.

  9. I note that this version is not able to perform all the tasks Parsons says inclusionism can—it cannot account for the possibility of isolated spacetimes. This does not matter in the present context. If the problem can be solved here it can be solved elsewhere.

  10. Parsons discusses two other problems which I do not mention. I do not consider these to be serious, and it seems Parsons agrees; at least, he takes the problem of unmarried husbands to be the most serious.

  11. There is a typo in Parsons’ paper (Parsons 2007a, p. 173): the second existential quantifier is missing from (what I am calling) S + .

  12. Parsons (2007a, pp. 173–177) discusses other strategies for responding to the problem of unmarried husbands besides the one I discuss, but finds them all wanting.

  13. I take it that the two requirements are independent of one another, and that only one of them needs to be met (rather than both).

  14. The idea that you could use inclusionism in a reductive analysis of intrinsicness if you have primitive modality is considered by Parsons, who attributes the idea to Yablo. See Parsons (2007a, fn 10).

  15. At least as long as temporal parts of an individual do not serve as counterparts to the individual. If they do then a reformed fiend would furnish himself with the necessary counterpart. This qualification does not alter the point—just restrict our attention to the perennial do-gooders.

  16. See Divers (1999) for discussion of extraordinary modalizing, and his proposed solution.

  17. An ad hominem: Parsons rejects Divers solution to the problem of extraordinary modalizing in any case. See Parsons (2007b).

References

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Chris Daly, Julian Dodd, David Liggins, and Josh Parsons for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I gratefully acknowledge funding provided by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.

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  1. Philosophy, Arthur Lewis Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK

    Michael J. Clark

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Clark, M.J. Inclusionism and the Problem of Unmarried Husbands. Erkenn 73, 123–131 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9208-4

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