First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism
- Dorit Bar-On
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What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for being dissatisfied with materialist introspectionism as a way out of the dilemma. In section 3, “Constitutivism”, I outline two constitutivist alternatives to materialist introspectionism. In section 4, “A Neo-Expressivist View”, I offer my neo-expressivist view (defended in Bar-On, Speaking my mind: Expression and self-knowledge. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004), according to which the distinctive status of mental self-ascriptions is to be explained by appeal to the expressive character of acts of issuing them (in speech or in thought). This view, I argue, allows us to stay clear of eliminativism without committing to Cartesian substance dualism, thereby offering a viable way of slipping between the horns of Rorty’s dilemma.
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- First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism
Volume 71, Issue 1 , pp 53-71
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Dorit Bar-On (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Philosophy Department, CB #3125, Caldwell Hall, UNC/Chapell Hill, Chapell Hill, NC, 27599-3125, USA