Incomplete contracts and competition: another look at fisher body/general motors?
- Antonio NicitaAffiliated withDepartment of Economics, University Of Siena Email author
- , Simone M. SepeAffiliated withUniversity of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
In this paper we analyze the problem of the enforcement of incomplete contracts with endogenous outside options. Some of the equilibria we outline may reverse one of the main results presented in the standard literature. We then revisit the literature on the highly debated Fisher Body/General Motors merger and suggest an explanation based on GM’s need to control the Fisher brothers’ outside options.
KeywordsIncomplete contracts Hold-up problem Transaction costs Endogenous outside options Cross competition Vertical integration
JEL ClassificationD23 L12 L14 L21 L22 L42
- Incomplete contracts and competition: another look at fisher body/general motors?
European Journal of Law and Economics
Volume 34, Issue 3 , pp 495-514
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer US
- Additional Links
- Incomplete contracts
- Hold-up problem
- Transaction costs
- Endogenous outside options
- Cross competition
- Vertical integration
- Industry Sectors