Abstract
This qualitative study examines the role of clients in petty corruption by analyzing actual corrupt exchanges between ordinary citizens and low level public and private employees in post-communist Hungary. Using a grounded theory approach, interviews reveal how clients from different social strata deal with low-level agents in corrupt situations. Findings suggest two contrasting forms of low-level corruption: transactions where the client and the agent do not have a prior relationship and where external factors dominate the relationship; and cases with stronger social ties between the actors, where the client has more freedom to structure the transaction. However, a client's social background frequently determines the form of corrupt transaction and the form of resources illegally exchanged in the deal.
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Appendix
Appendix
The interviews included questions such as the following:
What do you think generally about corruption in Hungary?
How common or widespread is corruption in your opinion?
What are the possible reasons for corruption in Hungary?
What are the typical excuses or explanations for corruption?
How does corruption influence your life?
Have you ever participated in corruption?
How did you get involved in a corrupt transaction or corruption?
What was your role in the transaction?
What was the other actors’ role in the transaction?
Can you describe the main phases of the transaction?
What was the status of the actors in the corruption you got involved?
Were they equal or rather unequal participants?
Who can initiate a corrupt transaction; in what situations?
Are there rules, codes, rituals or routines in these transactions?
Why do they remain silent about it?
Who are the central figures in corrupt networks?
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Jancsics, D. Petty corruption in Central and Eastern Europe: the client’s perspective. Crime Law Soc Change 60, 319–341 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9451-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9451-0