Abstract
Over the past decade - following the disastrous attacks of 9/11 - we have witnessed the introduction of a range of trans-border security programs designed to protect international supply chains against acts of terrorism. In most if not all cases, these programs comprehend the introduction of situational measures, and in many cases operators in the industry are left with limited guidance on how best to implement them. In academic literature on situational crime prevention it is argued that - when introduced without proper reflection and consideration - preventive measures can easily backfire and turn into the negative. It is argued that measures need to be carefully assessed prior to their implementation, and that this assessment should focus on various criteria. In the study reported on in this paper, these observations are illustrated by means of an ex ante consideration of alternative measures to control unauthorised access to pick-up and delivery vans. This study was conducted in 2011 in a Belgian branch of an international express operator, and is limited to the selection process of preventive measures only. The outcome illustrates that - when deciding on what measures best to implement - it may be worthwhile or even necessary not to focus on monetary costs only, but to also take a number of other cost items into consideration; and to make sure that a number of preconditions are in place in order for the introduction of a measure to be feasible and successful. It is argued that an exante consideration of alternative solutions will contribute to making the decision onwhat measures best to implement a more informed and balanced one.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This code was incorporated into European legislation with Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security, OJ, L 129/6, 29 April 2004.
Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, OJ, L355/1, 30 December 2002.
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on a simple and paperless environment for Customs and Trade and on the role of customs in the integrated management of external borders, COM (2003) 452, Brussels, 24 July 2003.
As an example, interceptions of improvised explosive devices originating from Yemen in 2010, have triggered US and EU governments to further enhance air cargo security regulations and introduce additional safeguards to protect civil aviation.
As argued by Bowers and Johnson (2003: 276), research indicates that crime displacement is not a necessary outcome of crime prevention activity, and it is also possible that crime reduction schemes may have a diffusion of benefits. Furthermore, it has been argued that even where displacement occurs, there may be some benefit to this (e.g. offenders choosing to commit less serious types of crimes than those prevented). A systematic review of 102 evaluations of situational crime prevention initiatives by Guerette and Bowers (2009) further supports the view that crime does not necessarily relocate in the aftermath of situational interventions.
According to Clarke (2005: 53), the concept of adaptation refers to the process through which ‘offender populations’ discover new crime vulnerabilities after preventive measures have been in place for a while. It is a longer term process than displacement, which refers to the ways that ‘individual offenders’ find to circumvent preventive measures.
Figures and further details were obtained from the Operations Manager of the branch.
The focus group consisted of four members: the Head of Security, the Aviation Security Manager, the Manager Security Compliance and the Security Manager responsible for the local branch.
The local Operations Manager, who has a clear view on all his drivers, could confirm that the spread of these background variables reflects the total spread in the targeted population. This means that the data used for further analyses was not substantially biased by a non-coverage problem.
The company’s official Confidant Advisor (i.e. ‘vertrouwenspersoon’) was asked to act as the central point of contact for the drivers.
Info obtained from the operator’s Engineering Department.
Access to this data was granted by the Head of Security.
The fact that a shipment is reported missing, can also relate to the fact that it had been delivered to the wrong address, or mistakenly swapped with another shipment due to some operational error.
When the survey was conducted, 27.3% of the respondents had been working for the operator for less than one year, 36.4% had been working with the company between one and five years, and another 36.4% for more than five years.
E.g. to optimise effectiveness in the example elaborated in this study, one can think of combining a measure that is tailored at making sure that van doors are locked at all times (e.g. card key) with one that is designed to detect intrusion (e.g. audible alarm).
If a measure is unavailable (e.g. because local law does not permit its use or implementation), it simply cannot be introduced.
There are no interdependencies if a measure can work on its own (i.e. without introducing additional measures). Examples of measures that are interdependent, are the installation of an electronic access control system and the introduction of access control procedures: just having the system installed without having access levels defined, will have no (or only a limited) effect.
The one-dimensional character of the scale was confirmed with principal axis factoring (a single own value greater than one). This scale tested well on internal consistency with an acceptable Cronbach’s Alfa value. Four items were withheld to build up the scale. See Appendix 1 for more detail.
To interpret the scores one must keep in mind that the scale is internally consistent (meaning that individual respondents answered consistently high or low on the four items); that a score of ‘four’ suggests the lowest possible level of awareness; and that a score of ‘20’ suggests the highest level of awareness possible.
The one-dimensional character of the scale was confirmed with principal axis factoring (a single own value greater than one). The scale tested good on internal consistency with an acceptable Cronbach’s. See Appendix 1 for more detail.
Idem.
See Appendix 1 for more details on the properties of the scale.
See Appendix 1 for more details on the properties of the scale.
Fixed costs are expenses that are not dependent on the level of goods or services produced or sold, while variable costs are considered to be expenses that change in proportion to the activity of a business (source: http://www.accountingtools.com, accessed 9 November 2010).
The yearly maintenance cost for (security) equipment is budgeted by the operator’s facility department at 15% of the total equipment cost.
Belgian private security legislation requires a private investigator’s license for conducting (covert) compliance checks on drivers. Conducting one check takes approximately 4 hours (info obtained from the operator’s Head of Security).
Info obtained from the operator’s preferred supplier.
Idem.
Info obtained from the operator’s Surveillance department and from the operator’s preferred supplier.
Again, responses have been plotted on a (five-point Likert) scale, tested by means of an exploratory factor analysis, and verified for internal consistency.
See Appendix 1 for more details on the properties of the scale.
Over the past decade there have been valuable contributions in criminological literature on how to measure displacement effects of crime reduction activities (see e.g. Bowers and Johnson 2003).
Displacement to process steps other than the pick-up and delivery process (e.g. offenders turning their attention to depot locations as a result of enhancing security in the transport process) has not been considered in this exercise.
References
Bijleveld, C. C. J. H. (2007). Methoden en Technieken van Onderzoek in de Criminologie (3 de druk). Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers.
Bowers, K. J., & Johnson, S. D. (2003). Measuring the geographical displacement and diffusion of benefit effects of crime prevention activity. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 19(3), 275–301.
Clarke, R. V. (Ed.). (1992). Situational crime prevention, successful case studies. New York: Harrow and Heston.
Clarke, R. V. (Ed.). (1997). Situational crime prevention, successful case studies (2nd ed.). New York: Harrow and Heston.
Clarke, R. V. (2005). Seven misconceptions of situational crime prevention. In N. Tilley (Ed.), Handbook of crime prevention and community safety (pp. 39–70). Devon: Willan.
Clarke, R. V. (2008). Situational crime prevention. In R. Wortley & L. Mazerolle (Eds.), Environmental criminology and crime analysis (pp. 178–194). Devon: Willan Publishing.
Cronin, A. (2001). Focus groups. In N. Gilbert (Ed.), Researching social life (2nd ed., pp. 164–177). London: Sage Publications.
Duff, R. A., & Marshall, S. E. (2000). Benefits, burdens and responsibilities: Some ethical dimensions of situational crime prevention. In A. Von Hirsch, D. Garland, & A. Wakefield (Eds.), Ethical and social perspectives on situational crime prevention (pp. 17–35). Oxford and Portland: Hart.
Eck, J., & Weisburd, D. (1995). Crime places in crime theory. In J. Eck & D. Weisburd (Eds.), Crime prevention studies (Crime and place, Vol. 4, pp. 1–33). Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press.
Grabosky, P. N. (1996). Unintended consequences of crime prevention. In R. Homel (Ed.), Crime prevention studies (The politics and practice of situational crime prevention, Vol. 4, pp. 25–56). Monsey: Criminal Justice Press.
Guerette, R.T. (2009). Analyzing crime displacement and diffusion. Center for Problem Oriented Policing Tool Guide No. 10., http://www.popcenter.org/tools/displacement/print/, accessed 5 January 2012.
Guerette, R. T., & Bowers, K. J. (2009). Assessing the extent of crime displacement and diffusion of benefits: a review of situational crime prevention evaluations. Criminology, 47(4), 1331–1368.
Haelterman, H. (2011). Re-thinking the cost of supply chain security. Crime, Law and Social Change, 56(4), 389–405.
Hamilton-Smith, N. (2002). Anticipated consequences: developing a strategy for the targeted measurement of displacement and diffusion of benefits. In N. Tilley (Ed.), Crime prevention studies (Evaluation for crime prevention, Vol. 14, pp. 11–52). Monsey-Devon: Criminal Justice Press-Willan.
Laycock, G. (2005). Deciding what to do. In N. Tilley (Ed.), Handbook of crime prevention and community safety (pp. 674–698). Devon: Willan.
Newburn, T. (2007). Criminology. Devon: Willan Publishing.
Procter, M. (2001). Measuring Attitudes. In N. Gilbert (Ed.), Researching Social Life (2nd ed., pp. 105–122). London: Sage.
Tilley, N. (2005). Introduction: thinking realistically about crime prevention. In N. Tilley (Ed.), Handbook of crime prevention and community safety (pp. 3–13). Devon: Willan.
Vettenburg, N., Burssens, D., Goris, P., Melis, B., Van Gils, J., Verdonck, D., et al. (2003). Preventie gespiegeld. Visie en instrumenten voor wenselijke preventive. Heverlee: Lannoo Campus.
Welsh, B. C., & Farrington, D. P. (1999). Value for money? A review of the costs and benefits of situational crime prevention. British Journal of Criminology, 39(3), 345–368.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix 1: Driver survey results
Statements are translated from the original (Dutch) questionnaire. Meanings can be slightly shifted due to this operation
Appendix 1: Driver survey results
a. Awareness scale
Used items | Factor loading | Cronbach’s Alfa |
5 point scale (‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree’) | 0.627 | |
“I think there is a great chance that a person with bad intentions will try to access my vehicle”. | 0.679 | |
“I think a lot can be done to prevent access to my vehicle”. | 0.590 | |
“I think the damage to the company caused by theft is big”. | 0.567 | |
“I think my colleagues don’t lock their vehicles appropriately”. | 0.364 |
b. Commitment scale
Used items | Factor loading | Cronbach’s Alfa |
5 point scale (‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree’) | 0.550 | |
“I don’t think I should engage myself in trying to prevent unauthorized to my vehicle during working hours”. (R) | 0.630 | |
“I would like to assist with the prevention of unauthorized access to my vehicle”. | 0.534 | |
“A driver is the ideal person to prevent unauthorized access to the vehicle”. | 0.486 |
c. Belief scale
Belief | Factor loading | ||||||||
5 point scale (‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree’) | Key card | Audible alarm | Silent alarm+ GPS | Formal instructions | Awareness training | Double drivers | Overt security escorts | No company logos | Notification on vehicles |
“I believe others would be deterred to enter my vehicle with this measure”. | 0.843 | 0.796 | 0.529 | 0.717 | 0.757 | 0.528 | 0.455 | 0.843 | 0.870 |
“This measure makes it more difficult for others to enter my vehicle”. | 0.759 | 0.929 | 0.876 | 0.807 | 0.983 | 0.630 | 0.567 | 0.802 | 0.682 |
“I think this is a useless measure”. (R) | 0.561 | 0.674 | 0.838 | 0.833 | 0.814 | 0.792 | 0.858 | 0.811 | 0.834 |
“I think this measure would not have an effect on the number of successful attempts to enter the vehicle”. (R) | 0.557 | 0.350 | 0.707 | 0.825 | 0.722 | 0.548 | 0.560 | 0.349 | 0.862 |
“One cannot fully secure a vehicle against intruders without the use of this measure”. | 0.498 | 0.832 | 0.506 | 0.585 | 0.487 | 0.746 | 0.587 | 0.895 | 0.809 |
Cronbach’s Alfa | 0.738 | 0.798 | 0.821 | 0.866 | 0.867 | 0.744 | 0.711 | 0.856 | 0.902 |
d. Practicability scale
Practicability | Factor loading | ||||||||
5 point scale (‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree’) | Key card | Audible alarm | Silent alarm+ GPS | Formal instructions | Awareness training | Double drivers | Overt security escorts | No company logos | Notification on vehicles |
“I would get used to this measure after a few hours”. | 0.911 | 0.665 | 0.448 | 0.763 | 0.756 | 0.882 | 0.898 | 0.742 | 0.757 |
“My job could go much easier thanks to this measure”. | 0.819 | 0.847 | 0.810 | 0.965 | 0.843 | 0.657 | 0.571 | 0.640 | 0.593 |
“I will need more time to finish my round with this measure”. (R) | 0.750 | 0.958 | 0.881 | 0.541 | 0.445 | 0.786 | 0.300 | 0.835 | 0.730 |
“I would be hindered in my job if this measure would be used”. (R) | 0.689 | 0.772 | 0.844 | 0.702 | 0.729 | 0.766 | 0.610 | 0.682 | 0.782 |
Cronbach’s Alfa | 0.847 | 0.883 | 0.828 | 0.820 | 0.773 | 0.872 | 0.646 | 0.815 | 0.751 |
e. Social cost
Social cost | Factor loading | ||||||||
5 point scale (‘fully agree’to ‘fully disagree’) | Key card | Audible alarm | Silent alarm+ GPS | Formal instructions | Awareness training | Double drivers | Overt security escorts | No company logos | Notification on vehicles |
“I would feel less free in my job if this was applied”. | 0.954 | 0.947 | 0.981 | 0.958 | 0.936 | 0.801 | 0.807 | 0.963 | 0.934 |
“This measure would not even be necessary if the company has enough confidence in the honesty of their drivers”. | 0.808 | 0.803 | 0.577 | 0.818 | 0.728 | 0.502 | 0.630 | 0.634 | 0.549 |
“I would feel invaded in my privacy by this measure”. | 0.777 | 0.856 | 0.907 | 0.934 | 0.743 | 0.713 | 0.746 | 0.864 | 0.656 |
“With this measure every driver is treated equally”. (R) | 0.751 | 0.736 | 0.655 | 0.709 | 0.742 | 0.520 | 0.451 | 0.801 | 0.899 |
“I would feel aimed at if this measure was applied”. | 0.605 | 0.613 | 0.733 | 0.696 | 0.527 | 0.813 | 0.613 | 0.976 | 0.895 |
Cronbach’s Alfa | 0.877 | 0.884 | 0.880 | 0.912 | 0.846 | 0.780 | 0.784 | 0.927 | 0.886 |
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Haelterman, H., Callens, M. & Beken, T.V. Controlling Access to Pick-up and Delivery Vans: The Cost of Alternative Measures. Eur J Crim Policy Res 18, 163–182 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-012-9170-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-012-9170-6