The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe
- Andrew Roberts
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This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of constitutional amendments in Eastern Europe. Its results challenge the conventional wisdom that constitutional change is a consequence of institutions and that major changes will increase executive powers and limit rights. It finds that the political and social context rather than institutions is the main cause of amendments. These amendments moreover tend to reduce the power of executives and strengthen guarantees of human rights. The paper attributes these results to the particular circumstances of the postcommunist transition.
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- The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe
Constitutional Political Economy
Volume 20, Issue 2 , pp 99-117
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- Constitutional amendment
- Democratic transition
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- Andrew Roberts (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA