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When CEO Career Horizon Problems Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Roles of Industry-Level Discretion and Blockholder Ownership

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Abstract

This paper examines the influence of CEO career horizon problems on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We assume that as CEOs are getting older, they tend to disengage in CSR due to their shorter career horizons. We further argue that high levels of industry-level discretion (ILD) and blockholder ownership amplify the negative effects of CEO age on CSR. Using a panel sample of US-based firms over 2004–2009, we do not find the main effect of CEO age on CSR, but find support for the moderating effects, such that CEO age is negatively associated with CSR when there are high levels of ILD and blockholder ownership. Therefore, results suggest that CEO career horizon problems matter for CSR when (1) CEOs have sufficient discretion over the firm’s strategic decisions and (2) outside blockholders put more pressure on CEOs to engage in financial earning management.

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Oh, WY., Chang, Y.K. & Cheng, Z. When CEO Career Horizon Problems Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Roles of Industry-Level Discretion and Blockholder Ownership. J Bus Ethics 133, 279–291 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2397-z

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