Journal of Business Ethics

, Volume 129, Issue 2, pp 491–510

Tunneling or Not? The Change of Legal Environment on the Effect of Post-Privatization Performance

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10551-014-2169-9

Cite this article as:
Tu, G. & Yu, F. J Bus Ethics (2015) 129: 491. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2169-9
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Abstract

Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s (Am Econ Rev 94(3):753–763, 2004) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance (PPP) of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State issued regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement.

Keywords

TunnelingPrivatizationInvestor protectionLaw and financeEthics

JEL Classification

G34M13N25N45

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Economics and Business AdministrationChongqing UniversityChongqingChina
  2. 2.China Europe International Business SchoolShanghaiChina