Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 26, Issue 6, pp 857–870

Drakes, seadevils, and similarity fetishism

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity at Albany, State University of New York
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10539-011-9284-0

Cite this article as:
Magnus, P.D. Biol Philos (2011) 26: 857. doi:10.1007/s10539-011-9284-0

Abstract

Homeostatic property clusters (HPCs) are offered as a way of understanding natural kinds, especially biological species. I review the HPC approach and then discuss an objection by Ereshefsky and Matthen, to the effect that an HPC qua cluster seems ill-fitted as a description of a polymorphic species. The standard response by champions of the HPC approach is to say that all members of a polymorphic species have things in common, namely dispositions or conditional properties. I argue that this response fails. Instances of an HPC kind need not all be similar in their exhibited properties. Instead, HPCs should instead be understood as unified by the underlying causal mechanism that maintains them. The causal mechanism can both produce and explain some systematic differences between a kind’s members. An HPC kind is best understood not as a single cluster of properties maintained in stasis by causal forces, but as a complex of related property clusters kept in relation by an underlying causal process. This approach requires recognizing that taxonomic systems serve both explanatory and inductive purposes.

Keywords

SpeciesPolymorphismHomeostatic property clusterNatural kind

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011