Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 51–64

Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?

Authors

Original Research

DOI: 10.1007/s10539-010-9235-1

Cite this article as:
Brosnan, K. Biol Philos (2011) 26: 51. doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9235-1

Abstract

According to some recent arguments, (Joyce in The evolution of morality, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006; Ruse and Wilson in Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995; Street in Philos Studies 127: 109–166, 2006) if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, (a) the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and (b) the claim (or a certain interpretation of the claim) that natural selection fails to track moral facts. I also argue that natural selection is a process that could track moral facts, albeit imperfectly. I do not argue that we do have moral knowledge. I argue instead that Darwinian considerations provide us with no reason to doubt that we do, and with some reasons to suppose that we might.

Keywords

Evolutionary ethics Moral realism Moral epistemology

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010