Biology and Philosophy

, Volume 20, Issue 4, pp 715–734

Emergent properties and the context objection to reduction

Authors

    • Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of LearningUniversity of Pittsburgh
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10539-004-2437-7

Cite this article as:
Delehanty, M. Biol Philos (2005) 20: 715. doi:10.1007/s10539-004-2437-7

Abstract

Reductionism is a central issue in the philosophy of biology. One common objection to reduction is that molecular explanation requires reference to higher-level properties, which I refer to as the context objection. I respond to this objection by arguing that a well-articulated notion of a mechanism and what I term mechanism extension enables one to accommodate the context-dependence of biological processes within a reductive explanation. The existence of emergent features in the context could be raised as an objection to the possibility of reduction via this strategy. I argue that this objection can be overcome by showing that there is no tenable argument for the existence of emergent properties that are not susceptible to a reductive explanation.

Keywords

ContextDictyostelium discoideumEmergenceMechanismReduction

Copyright information

© Springer 2005