, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 135–146

Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”

Invited paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10516-011-9167-7

Cite this article as:
Peucker, H. Axiomathes (2012) 22: 135. doi:10.1007/s10516-011-9167-7


This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts are given to us in a categorical abstraction.


HusserlLogical investigationsLogicTheory of theoriesTheory of scienceMeaning-categoriesPure logical grammarCategorial intuitionCategorial abstraction

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität Paderborn PhilosophiePaderbornGermany