Contradiction in Buddhist Argumentation
- Mark Siderits
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Certain Buddhist texts contain statements that are prima facie contradictions. The scholarly consensus has been that such statements are meant to serve a rhetorical function that depends on the apparent contradictions being resolvable. But recently it has been claimed that such statements are meant to be taken literally: their authors assert as true statements that are of the form ‘p and not p’. This claim has ramifications for our understanding of the role played by the principle of non-contradiction in Buddhist argumentation. I argue that these make the claim less plausible.
- Garfield, Jay L. (2002) Empty words, Buddhist philosophy and cross-cultural interpretation. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- La Vallée Poussin, L. de. 1970. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna, avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti, first published St. Petersburg, 1903–1913, reprinted Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück.
- Priest, Graham G. 2004. Dialetheism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/dialetheism/, first published 1998, substantially revised 2004.
- Priest, Graham G., and Jay L. Garfield. 2002. Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought. In Beyond the limits of thought, ed. Graham Priest. Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press, also included in Jay Garfield (2002).
- Contradiction in Buddhist Argumentation
Volume 22, Issue 1 , pp 125-133
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- Mark Siderits (1)
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, Illinois State University, Campus Box 4540, Normal, IL, 61790-4540, USA