Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
 Maria Silvia Pini,
 Francesca Rossi,
 K. Brent Venable,
 Toby Walsh
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The stable marriage problem is a wellknown problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors, to hospitals to matching students to schools. A wellknown algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale–Shapley algorithm, which runs in quadratic time in the number of men/women. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale–Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NPhard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NPhard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NPhard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale–Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral.
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 Title
 Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
 Journal

Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Volume 22, Issue 1 , pp 183199
 Cover Date
 20110101
 DOI
 10.1007/s104580109121x
 Print ISSN
 13872532
 Online ISSN
 15737454
 Publisher
 Springer US
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Keywords

 Computational social choice
 Stable marriage problems
 Manipulation
 Voting theory
 Industry Sectors
 Authors

 Maria Silvia Pini ^{(1)}
 Francesca Rossi ^{(1)}
 K. Brent Venable ^{(1)}
 Toby Walsh ^{(2)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Dipartimento di Matematica Pura ed Applicata, Università di Padova, Padua, Italy
 2. NICTA and UNSW, Sydney, NSW, Australia