Issue linkage in clean technology cooperation: for better or worse?
- Johannes UrpelainenAffiliated withDepartment of Political Science, Columbia University Email author
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How should states negotiate and form international agreements to promote clean technology? This paper provides a game–theoretic analysis of the consequences of issue linkage between different technologies. The model suggests that issue linkage increases states’ incentives to participate in clean technology cooperation if their primary interest is in environmental protection and reduced consumer prices, as opposed to international competitiveness. However, issue linkage impedes clean technology cooperation if states mostly worry about international competitiveness. These findings can explain the decentralized nature of contemporary cooperation on clean technology and help devise strategies for inducing more countries to participate in clean technology cooperation.
KeywordInternational cooperation Environmental policy Clean technology Issue linkage Game theory
- Issue linkage in clean technology cooperation: for better or worse?
Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy
Volume 15, Issue 1 , pp 147-155
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
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- International cooperation
- Environmental policy
- Clean technology
- Issue linkage
- Game theory
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 420 W 118th St, 712 IAB, New York, NY, 10027, USA