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Coalition formation in general NTU games

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Abstract.

A general nontransferable utility (NTU) game is interpreted as a collection of pure bargaining games that can be played by individual coalitions. The threatpoints or claims points respectively, in these pure bargaining games reflect the players' opportunities outside a given coalition. We develop a solution concept for general NTU games that is consistent in the sense that the players' outside opportunities are determined by the solution to a suitably defined reduced game. For any general NTU game the solution predicts which coalitions are formed and how the payoffs are distributed among the players.

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Gerber, A. Coalition formation in general NTU games. Rev Econ Design 5, 149–175 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000016

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000016

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