Abstract
We examine bidding behavior in a clock auction in which price is set by the lowest-accepted bid and provisional winners are reported each round (the LABpw auction). This format was used in the India 3G spectrum auction. In the standard theory, the auction performs poorly. In particular it yields lower revenues and is less efficient than the more standard clock auction with exit bids and highest-rejected-bid pricing (the HRB auction). However, the LABpw auction performs well in the lab, achieving higher revenues than the HRB auction. We show how fear of losing provides one motivation for the overbidding that causes higher revenues in the LABpw auction.
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We thank our colleagues, Lawrence M. Ausubel and Daniel R. Vincent, for helpful discussions. We thank the National Science Foundation for support.
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Cramton, P., Filiz-Ozbay, E., Ozbay, E.Y. et al. Fear of losing in a clock auction. Rev Econ Design 16, 119–134 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0121-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0121-y