Review of Economic Design

, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 217–224

On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda

  • Robin Christian
  • Mike Fellows
  • Frances Rosamond
  • Arkadii Slinko
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0028-1

Cite this article as:
Christian, R., Fellows, M., Rosamond, F. et al. Rev. Econ. Design (2007) 11: 217. doi:10.1007/s10058-007-0028-1

Abstract

In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters’ preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.

Keywords

Lobbying Referendum Parametrized complexity 

JEL Classification Numbers

D72 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robin Christian
    • 1
  • Mike Fellows
    • 2
  • Frances Rosamond
    • 2
  • Arkadii Slinko
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Combinatorics and OptimizationUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada
  2. 2.Parameterized Complexity Research UnitUniversity of NewcastleNewcastleAustralia
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsUniversity of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand