Soft Computing

, 13:127

On characterization of credibilistic equilibria of fuzzy-payoff two-player zero-sum game


DOI: 10.1007/s00500-008-0310-3

Cite this article as:
Gao, J., Liu, ZQ. & Shen, P. Soft Comput (2009) 13: 127. doi:10.1007/s00500-008-0310-3


Harsanyi pointed out that “the player may lack full information about the other players’ (or even his own) payoffs, etc.” In this paper, we investigate the two-player zero-sum game, in which the payoffs are interpreted as fuzzy variables due to incomplete information. Based on the credibility theory, we employ three decision criteria to define the behaviors of the players in different decision situations. Accordingly, three definitions of Nash equilibria, called credibilistic equilibria, are proposed. Besides the existence theorem of the three credibilistic equilibria, we also discuss their relationships to illustrate the significance of the proposed credibilistic equilibria.


GameFuzzy variableCredibility measureCredibilistic equilibrium

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Uncertain Systems Lab, School of InformationRenmin University of ChinaBeijingChina
  2. 2.School of Creative MediaCity University of Hong KongHong KongChina