Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 353–362

Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis

  • Özgür Kıbrıs

DOI: 10.1007/s003550200183

Cite this article as:
Kıbrıs, Ö. Soc Choice Welfare (2003) 20: 353. doi:10.1007/s003550200183
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Abstract.

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Özgür Kıbrıs
    • 1
  1. 1.Sabancı University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, 81474, Orhanlı, Tuzla, İstanbul, Turkey (e-mail: ozgur@sabanciuniv.edu)TR