Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
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- Dellis, A. & Oak, M. Soc Choice Welf (2016) 46: 1. doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0900-9
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We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that alternative voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. This result differs from the one obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using different voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.