Article

Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 39, Issue 2, pp 521-536

The partnered core of a game with side payments

  • Philip J. RenyAffiliated withUniversity of Chicago
  • , Eyal WinterAffiliated withHebrew University
  • , Myrna WoodersAffiliated withVanderbilt University Email author 

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Abstract

An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games.