Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 36, Issue 3, pp 591–610

Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0511-4

Cite this article as:
Gallego, M.E. & Scoones, D. Soc Choice Welf (2011) 36: 591. doi:10.1007/s00355-010-0511-4
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Abstract

A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155–162, 1950) bargaining framework. With heterogeneous parties, agreements and electoral outcomes depend on the concavity of the utility functions of negotiators and on the relative location of their ideal policies, i.e., depend on the negotiators relative willingness to compromise. Agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWilfrid Laurier UniversityWaterlooCanada
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of VictoriaVictoriaCanada