Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
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- Van der Straeten, K., Laslier, JF., Sauger, N. et al. Soc Choice Welf (2010) 35: 435. doi:10.1007/s00355-010-0448-7
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We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).