Original Paper

Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 421-437

First online:

Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

  • Özgür KıbrısAffiliated withFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University Email author 
  • , Murat R. SertelAffiliated withDepartment of Economics, Koç Üniversity

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We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for "good" ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued.