Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 421–437

Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

Authors

    • Faculty of Arts and Social SciencesSabancı University
  • Murat R. Sertel
    • Department of EconomicsKoç Üniversity
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z

Cite this article as:
Kıbrıs, Ö. & Sertel, M.R. Soc Choice Welfare (2007) 28: 421. doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z

Abstract

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for "good" ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006