Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games
 K. Argasinski,
 M. Broom
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Abstract
In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of “costs” and “benefits”, there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure “benefit” or “cost”? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic “cost” versus “benefits”, is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of tradeoffs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk–Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced.
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 Title
 Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games
 Open Access
 Available under Open Access This content is freely available online to anyone, anywhere at any time.
 Journal

Journal of Mathematical Biology
Volume 67, Issue 4 , pp 935962
 Cover Date
 20131001
 DOI
 10.1007/s0028501205732
 Print ISSN
 03036812
 Online ISSN
 14321416
 Publisher
 Springer Berlin Heidelberg
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Keywords

 Replicator dynamics
 Mortality
 Fertility
 Ecoevolutionary feedback
 Tradeoff
 Density dependence
 92D40
 Authors

 K. Argasinski ^{(1)}
 M. Broom ^{(2)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Department of Mathematics, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QH, UK
 2. Centre for Mathematical Science, City University London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK