Polly Two : A New Algebraic Polynomial-based Public-Key Scheme


DOI: 10.1007/s00200-006-0010-0

Cite this article as:
Van Ly, L. AAECC (2006) 17: 267. doi:10.1007/s00200-006-0010-0


Since Fellows and Koblitz introduced the generic combinatorially algebraic public-key cryptosystem Polly Cracker in 1993, the question whether there exist secure and efficient instances of Polly Cracker remains unsettled. Namely, many of these schemes succumb to the Linear-Algebra Attacks by D. Naccache et al. and Lenstra. In this paper I present a public-key cryptoscheme Polly Two that is efficient and in some way a modified Polly-Cracker instance, but comprises techniques defending the linear-algebra attacks.


Combinatorially algebraic public-key cryptoschemes Polly Cracker EnRoot Linear-Algebra attacks Sparse polynomials System of algebraic equations Elimination ideals 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)BonnGermany

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