Economic Theory

, Volume 19, Issue 4, pp 773–790

A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations

Authors

  • Yan Chen
    • Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220, USA (e-mail: yanchen@umich.edu)
Research Articles

DOI: 10.1007/s001990100174

Cite this article as:
Chen, Y. Econ Theory (2002) 19: 773. doi:10.1007/s001990100174

Summary.

We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class of learning dynamics.

Keywords and Phrases: Public goods mechanisms, Supermodular games.
JEL Classification Numbers: H41, C62, D83.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002