Economic Theory

, Volume 51, Issue 3, pp 601–626

Herding with collective preferences

Authors

    • Department of EconomicsUniversity of California, San Diego
  • Navin Kartik
    • Department of EconomicsColumbia University
Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7

Cite this article as:
Ali, S.N. & Kartik, N. Econ Theory (2012) 51: 601. doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7

Abstract

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving.

Keywords

Social learningObservational learningHerd behaviorPayoff interdependenceSequential votingMomentum

JEL Classification

D7D8
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011