Economic Theory

, Volume 34, Issue 2, pp 297–308

On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules

Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0168-5

Cite this article as:
Agastya, M. Economic Theory (2008) 34: 297. doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0168-5
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Abstract

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a “strategic situation” is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures that are used to allocate the surplus. We model the choice problem facing a decision maker (DM) as having to choose from finitely many “actions”. The known “consequence” of the ith action is a coalition from game fi over a fixed set of players \(N_i\cup\{d\}\) (where d stands for the DM). Axioms are imposed on her choice as the list of consequences (f1,..., fm) from the m actions varies. We characterize choice rules that are based on marginal contributions of the DM in general and on the Shapley Value in particular.

Keywords

Unstructured strategic interactionCoalition form gamesIndividual decision makingShapley valueMarginal contributions

JEL Classification Numbers

C79D89

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Economics DisciplineUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia