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The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse

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Abstract

We examine the role that belief, network externality, and information aggregation play in inefficient market collapses. After receiving consecutive negative shocks, some ex-ante identical Bayesian agents will be discouraged about the unknown state of the market they invest; therefore, they will stop investing. This decision will have two effects: first, it will cause agents to aggregate information through social/observational learning; second, it will decrease the network externality effect. We show that there might be an inefficient market collapse if the externality effect diminishes too much, and the cost of re-entry to the market is too high. We also analyze the effects of strategic delay and experimentation on the exit decision of the agents.

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Correspondence to Hikmet Gunay.

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I especially thank Thomas D. Jeitschko, Matthew Mitchell, B. Ravikumar Ted Temzelides. I also thank anonymous referees, an associate editor, John Conlon, Larry Samuelson, Troy Tassier, Stephen Williamson, and seminar participants of the University of Saskatchewan, Georgia Tech, Concordia University, University of Manitoba, Iowa Alumni Workshop, Midwest Economic Theory Conferences held at Indiana Bloomington, and Notre Dame, and 1st International Conference on Business, Management and Economics organized by Yasar University.

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Gunay, H. The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse. Economic Theory 35, 367–379 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0158-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0158-7

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