Economic Theory

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 103–119

Survival auctions


  • John H. Kagel
    • Department of EconomicsThe Ohio State University
  • Svetlana Pevnitskaya
    • Department of EconomicsFlorida State University
    • Department of EconomicsThe Ohio State University

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0156-9

Cite this article as:
Kagel, J.H., Pevnitskaya, S. & Ye, L. Economic Theory (2007) 33: 103. doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0156-9


Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces inefficiencies of its own given the time cost of congregating bidders. In this experiment we explore the effects of removing these inefficiencies through survival auctions—a multi-round sealed-bid auction which is theoretically isomorphic to the dynamic clock auction with drop-out information.


Survival auctionVickrey auctionAusubel auctionMulti-unit demand auction

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© Springer-Verlag 2006