, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp 575-578
Date: 21 Jun 2006

Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access


We show that every N-player K 1  ×  ...  ×  K N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least \(\prod_{i=1}^{N} K_i -1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} K_i (K_i -1)\) zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K  ×  ...  ×  K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games.

We thank an anonymous referee for most useful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant SEJ2004-03619, and in form of a Ramón y Cajal fellowship. The second author acknowledges support by the PASCAL Network of Excellence under EC grant no.506778, as well as from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and FEDER, grant BMF2003-03324. Both authors also acknowledge financial support from BBVA grant “Aprender a jugar.”