Economic Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 411–416

Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]

Exposita Note

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0117-3

Cite this article as:
Klaus, B. & Klijn, F. Economic Theory (2007) 32: 411. doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0117-3

Abstract

Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.”

Keywords

Random order mechanismStabilityTwo-sided matching

JEL Classification Number

C78

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)Campus UABBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain