Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
This paper examines the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a Bertrand model of price competition where firms supply all demand. When firms are asymmetric we prove existence and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. For symmetric firms, we show that an equilibrium is necessarily unique. We also examine whether this unique equilibrium outcome is implementable through a sequential move game where the firms take turns at announcing prices. Finally we examine the limiting property of such equilibria as the number of firms go to infinity.
JEL Classification Numbers:
D43, D41, L13.
- Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria
Volume 24, Issue 2 , pp 307-324
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Additional Links
- Bertrand oligopoly
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
- Folk theorem
- Industry Sectors