Economic Theory

, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp 909–923

Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0409-9

Cite this article as:
Morgan, J. Economic Theory (2004) 23: 909. doi:10.1007/s00199-003-0409-9


In an incomplete information, common values setting with risk-neutral agents, we consider mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership where the mechanism designer has no information about the distribution of signals of the agents. We find that the divide and choose mechanism systematically favors the chooser and hence fails on the grounds of fairness. We also examine the fairness properties of the winning and losing bid auctions and show that they systematically favor winning (resp. losing) bidder in ex post allocation of surplus. Finally, we show that a binding arbitration mechanism implements fair allocations.

Keywords and Phrases:

Fair divisionDivide and choose mechanismAuctionsMechanism design.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Haas School of Business and Department of Economics,University of California, Berkeley,Berkeley,USA