Economic Theory

, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 675–683

Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions

  • Oleksii Birulin
Exposita Note

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0317-4

Cite this article as:
Birulin, O. Econ Theory (2003) 22: 675. doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0317-4
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Summary.

I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient undominated ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for every auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium.

Keywords and Phrases: Auction, VCG mechnism, Ex-post equilibrium, Efficiency. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D44. 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oleksii Birulin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16801, USA (e-mail: oxb108@psu.edu) US