Economic Theory

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 45–62

Dictatorial domains


  • Navin Aswal
    • PROS Revenue Management, Houston, USA
  • Shurojit Chatterji
    • Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, Mexico D.F. 10700, MEXICO
  • Arunava Sen
    • Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi 110016, INDIA (e-mail:
Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8

Cite this article as:
Aswal, N., Chatterji, S. & Sen, A. Econ Theory (2003) 22: 45. doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8


In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.

Keywords and Phrases: Social choice functions, Strategyproof, Dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Restricted domains.
JEL Classification Numbers: D71.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003