Research Article

Economic Theory

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 45-62

First online:

Dictatorial domains

  • Navin AswalAffiliated withPROS Revenue Management, Houston, USA
  • , Shurojit ChatterjiAffiliated withCentro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, Mexico D.F. 10700, MEXICO
  • , Arunava SenAffiliated withIndian Statistical Institute, New Delhi 110016, INDIA (e-mail:

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In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.

Keywords and Phrases: Social choice functions, Strategyproof, Dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Restricted domains.
JEL Classification Numbers: D71.