, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 45-62

Dictatorial domains

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Summary.

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.

Received: July 12, 2000; revised version: March 21, 2002
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ID="*" The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments.
Correspondence to: A. Sen