Economic Theory

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 33–44

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

  • Federico Echenique
Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0277-8

Cite this article as:
Echenique, F. Econ Theory (2003) 22: 33. doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0277-8


The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

Keywords and Phrases: Supermodular games, Strategic complementarities, Mixed strategy equilibria, Learning.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Federico Echenique
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Miñones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA AR
  2. 2.Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, URUGUAY (e-mail: UY