International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp 339–357

An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria

Authors

  • Srihari Govindan
    • Department of EconomicsUniversity of Western Ontario
    • Université Catholique LouvainVoie du Roman Pays 34
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s001820400165

Cite this article as:
Govindan, S. & Mertens, J. Int J Game Theory (2004) 32: 339. doi:10.1007/s001820400165
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Abstract.

Characterisations of stable equilibria in terms of the best reply correspondence are given.

Key words

GameNon-CooperativeN-PersonEquilibriaRefinementsStability

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004