International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp 339–357

An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria


DOI: 10.1007/s001820400165

Cite this article as:
Govindan, S. & Mertens, JF. Int J Game Theory (2004) 32: 339. doi:10.1007/s001820400165


Characterisations of stable equilibria in terms of the best reply correspondence are given.

Key words

Game Non-Cooperative N-Person Equilibria Refinements Stability 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Western OntarioLondonCanada
  2. 2.Université Catholique LouvainVoie du Roman Pays 34Louvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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