International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 27, Issue 3, pp 375–392

Population uncertainty and Poisson games

  • Roger B. Myerson

DOI: 10.1007/s001820050079

Cite this article as:
Myerson, R. Game Theory (1998) 27: 375. doi:10.1007/s001820050079


A general class of models is developed for analyzing games with population uncertainty. Within this general class, a special class of Poisson games is defined. It is shown that Poisson games are uniquely characterized by properties of independent actions and environmental equivalence. The general definition of equilibrium for games with population uncertainty is formulated, and it is shown that the equilibria of Poisson games are invariant under payoff-irrelevant type splitting. An example of a large voting game is discussed, to illustrate the advantages of using a Poisson game model for large games.

Key words: Population uncertaintyPoisson distributionBayesian games

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger B. Myerson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208-2009, USA (e-mail: