Abstract
We study a non-symmetric variant of General Lotto games introduced in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008). We provide a complete characterization of optimal strategies for both players in non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games, where one of the players has an advantage over the other. By this we complete the characterization given in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008), where the strategies for symmetric case were fully characterized and some of the optimal strategies for the non-symmetric case were obtained. We find a group of completely new atomic strategies, which are used as building components for the optimal strategies. Our results are applicable to discrete variants of all-pay auctions.
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Acknowledgements
I am indebted to the anonymous referees whose advices helped to improve the exposition of the paper.
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Marcin Dziubiński: On leave from Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw.
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Dziubiński, M. Non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games. Int J Game Theory 42, 801–833 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0324-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0324-z